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Neoliberalism has become a common, if contested, frame of 
reference for IPE to understand the governance of the global 
economy. In examining such complex terrain, this chapter 
begins by offering four prominent starting points for the 
analysis of neoliberalism: (1) as a history of intellectual ideas; 
(2) as a system of enhanced capitalist power; (3) as a cultural 
examination of everyday conduct; and (4) as a more generic, 
post-Marxist expression to denote the current zeitgeist. The 
discussion proceeds to dissect neoliberalism via three major 
‘acts’: (1) from the late 1970s to the early 1990s; (2) from the 
mid 1990s to the mid 2000s; and (3) from the late 2000s to the 
present. Significant contributions from IPE are discussed in 






Neoliberalism has become a common, if still contested, conceptual frame of reference 
for International Political Economy (IPE) scholars to better understand the governance 
of the global economy. With its theoretical roots in the 1930s, the term has been called 
upon to represent, clarify or, through normative arguments, denounce a wide variety 
of things. If there is a connecting theme which unites users of the term it concerns how 
to think about the patterns of capitalism since the 1980s, with particular reference to 
commodification tendencies, the special role of finance, and wider socio-economic 
inequalities. This chapter offers an overview of the theoretical debates in IPE and allied 
disciplines on the subject of neoliberalism. It situates the meanings and disputes of 
scholars in relation to how the empirical environment of the world economy has 
changed over the past four decades. In examining this complex terrain, the argument 
begins by offering four prominent starting points for the analysis of neoliberalism: (1) 
as a history of intellectual ideas; (2) as a system of enhanced capitalist power in which 
marketisation is stressed; (3) as a cultural examination of everyday conduct; and (4) 
as a more generic post-Marxist expression to denote the current zeitgeist. With this 
foundation in mind, the discussion proceeds to map neoliberalism through three major 
‘acts’: (1) from the late 1970s to the early 1990s; (2) from the mid 1990s to the mid 
2000s; and (3) from the late 2000s to the present. While noting the difficulty of chiseling 
history into such temporal forms, it nonetheless remains helpful for better grasping 




2. FOUR STARTING POINTS ON NEOLIBERALISM 
 
Since the 1980s, use of the concept of neoliberalism has taken off in academic 
dialogues and, in addition, within many countries, the term is found as a framing device 
to mobilise actors on the political left. Similar to other applications in the social 
sciences, such as in heterodox economics, geography, sociology, and anthropology, 
‘neoliberalism’ in the field of IPE has been adopted has a kind of catch-all for the 
current capitalist age or even modernity itself. As the meaning of the expression has 
been stretched across different spaces, institutions, and domains, the notion has 
unsurprisingly become a rather ‘unstable signifier’ which, over time, appears to be 
‘becoming even-more plastic, porous, and promiscuous’ (Peck 2010: 31). It is still 
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possible, nonetheless, to point towards four starting points on how to theorise 
neoliberalism which can guide us through understanding political economy. 
 
The first – and arguably most coherent meaning – is to understand neoliberalism as a 
movement of intellectual ideas. In this context, from the 1930s to the 1960s, 
neoliberalism had an earlier gestation when the word was used in a positive sense by 
a network of economists, philosophers, and political thinkers, such as Ludwig von 
Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Wilhelm Röpke. These critics had different ideas on why 
liberalism could or should be given the prefix of ‘neo’. In one respect, they drew 
inspiration from the Victorian liberalism of the nineteenth century but, at the same time, 
saw a need to manage so-called ‘collectivist threats’, notably state socialism, but also 
Nazism and corporate monopolies, which impeded their vision of economic and 
political ‘freedom’ (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Jackson 2010; Peck 2010; Jones 
2012). Organised around the Mont Pèlerin Society, these early neoliberal intellectuals 
were against the eighteenth and nineteenth century vision of laissez-faire which, in 
light of a radically different and turbulent socio-political order, was read by one 
prominent member as a ‘grotesque’ basis for future policymaking (Lippmann 
2009[1937]: 186). In contrast to some cliché depictions of these writers, many were 
keen to advocate a strong state, underpinned by the rule of law, as the surest 
foundation for a viable commercial system (Hayek 2008[1944]). Unsurprisingly, there 
were disagreements within this wider ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009), such as so-called ordoliberals, like Röpke, who advocated stricter state 
intervention to facilitate a social market economy, a position not shared by all in the 
Austrian school (Cerny 2016; Bonefeld 2017). From the late 1970s, as an adaptable 
body of ideas, one which was disseminated through particular think tanks and 
departments of economics, neoliberal political economy began to move from the 
margins to mainstream policy, particularly in the UK, the US and France. 
 
It is around this time that the second and now dominant meaning of neoliberalism 
enters the discourse: an economic (or economistic) reading of ‘rule’, ‘discipline’ or even 
‘tyranny’ by markets (Bourdieu 2003; Harvey 2005; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 
2010; Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2012). It is useful to recall that the main source of 
this sense was not found in academia but in social activist circles, such as in the 
opposition to Augusto Pinochet’s rule in Chile (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). Within 
the Marxist tradition, David Harvey’s (2005) contribution stands as an important 
touchstone for many. For Harvey (2005: 22), neoliberalism can be defined as a theory 
of political economic practice focused on the pursuit of ‘entrepreneurial freedom’ within 
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an institutional framework that calls for ‘private property rights, individual liberty, 
unencumbered markets and free trade’. Particular attention has been devoted to the 
role of financial capital or financialisation as a distinctive feature of the neoliberal era 
(Krippner 2011; Fine and Saad-Filho 2017). Against socialist, neocorporatist and 
certain Keynesian tools of policy management, the primary logic of neoliberalism is, in 
Harvey’s view, to reshape and reconsolidate elite class power, in both its national and 
transnational configurations (also see Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005; Duménil and 
Lévy 2011). From the 1990s, this basic pattern of defining neoliberalisation as dictation 
by privatising ‘market forces’ found currency in the work of many IPE theorists, 
including earlier work by Stephen Gill (1995, 1998), as well as more recent 
applications, such as Stuart Shield’s (2012) analysis of post-Communist transition in 
Eastern Central Europe; Adam Morton’s (2011) Gramscian-infused dissection of 
Mexico’s post-1970s makeover; and Huw Macartney’s (2011) unpacking of 
‘variegated’ forms of neoliberal rule within the EU, to name but three notable projects. 
 
At the same time, one clearly does not need to be within a neo-Marxist mould to 
appreciate how dominant ideas and material interests are often coiled together. This 
leads us to a third starting point for understanding the appropriation of neoliberalism 
as a term in IPE: the literature found within constructivist and cultural political economy. 
For some theorists, neoliberal policy ideas, such as around capital account 
liberalisation, can be objectified, measured, and weighted, with a view to assessing 
what precise role they play in policymaking (Chwieroth 2010). Another group of related 
theorists have explored how neoliberal financialisation has become embedded in 
ordinary life, generating important study enquiries (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007). 
Other theorists have preferred a ‘messier’, post-positivist view of neoliberalism, one 
inspired by Foucault (1980, 2008), which treats neoliberalism ‘as a flowing and flexible 
conglomeration of calculative notions, strategies and technologies aimed at fashioning 
populations and people’ (Wacquant 2012: 69). As argued by neo-Foucauldians (Dean 
2010; Dardot and Laval 2013), this latter approach tries to elucidate a more diffuse, 
networked theorisation of capitalist power and its affective forms, including the ongoing 
remaking of a so-called neoliberal subjectivity. Within this conceptualisation, IPE 
scholars such as Paul Langley (2008) have been attentive to novel forms of cultural 
normativity claimed to be reflective of neoliberalism, such as the idea of the ‘everyday 
investor’. 
 
The increasing use of the concept of neoliberalism by IPE theorists can also be 
explained by larger intellectual trends in the social sciences, the socio-political reasons 
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of which often pass underexplored (Eagleton-Pierce 2016). This brings forward a 
fourth starting point – which shares some overlapping features with the second and 
third positions above – around how the concept has been used within post-Marxist 
debates. From the 1980s, the general weakening of Marxism and, in turn, the rise of 
other agendas, particularly around identity politics (gender, race, ethnicity etc.), led to 
a search for alternative concepts to ‘capitalism’. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: xi) 
have argued in sociology:  
 
Dethroned from its status of key concept of the 1970s, ‘capitalism’ has been 
reduced to an inferior status – a somewhat indecent swearword – because it 
implied a Marxist terminology that many sociologists wished to forget, but also 
because it referred to something too ‘large’, too ‘bulky’ to be immediately 
observable and describable via the observation of specific situations. 
 
Thus, for some academics at least, ‘neoliberalism’ is helpful because it allows those 
who use it to speak about capitalist phenomena – such as commodity exchange, 
financialisation, or consumerism, among many other topics – but without recourse to 
a Marxist vocabulary and set of theories that may be viewed as ‘unfashionable’ or 
insufficient. Elsewhere, one could also suggest that ‘globalisation’, one of the dominant 
terms of the 1990s, lost a degree of conceptual and policy luster around the turn of the 
millennium, probably due to the tarnishing of the word via the alter-globalisation 
movement. This effect possibly encouraged other scholars to turn to the notion of 
neoliberalism as a way to refresh scholarly agendas, but around an expression that 
had acquired a sharper critical bite. 
 
As outlined in the introduction to this book, we can see how the theorisation of 
neoliberalism, similar to other conceptual traditions in IPE, has evolved in relation to 
commercial changes in the world economy, along with more autonomous academic 
debates. It is necessary to now discuss this historical relationship between these 
material and symbolic structures in order to grasp the uses and potential value of 
neoliberalism as an analytical device. Overall, it can be noted how there has been an 
increased tendency to view neoliberalisation as a highly complex, often unsteady and 
crisis-prone process of institutional regulation, one which has spawned different 
‘geographies, modalities and pathways’ over successive ‘waves’ of policy reform 
(Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010: 182). Given this highly complicated history since 
the late 1970s, one should caution against not only being misled by clichéd, ideological 
depictions of ‘neoliberalism as free markets’, but also the possibility of chiseling a 
precise definition that can illuminate such diverse conditions and outcomes (Clarke 
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2008; Venugopal 2015; Eagleton-Pierce 2016). To adopt a different metaphor, if 




3. NEOLIBERALISM ACT I: LATE 1970s–EARLY 1990s 
 
In many accounts of the development of the mainstream neoliberal policy era, attention 
is devoted to the particular political context within the UK and US from the late 1970s 
to the early 1990s. It is important to note that ‘the New Right’ – one of the more 
common phrases to encapsulate such shifts at the time – did not emerge as a 
calculated and codified plan by its chief advocates. Although one can always identify 
certain Machiavellian ‘free market purists’ at the point of conception, the actually 
making of ‘hegemonic neoliberalism’ (Rupert 1990, 1995; Gill 1995) was spawned out 
of a set of unpredictable socio-economic dislocations and often confusing political 
struggles. For instance, in the UK, in part inspired by Hayek and Milton Friedman, the 
first major experiment with privatisation was under Prime Minister Thatcher’s 
administration (1979-1990). In the first Thatcher term (1979-1983), however, the Tory 
vision of privatisation was not well-articulated and tended to proceed cautiously and 
haphazardly, often justified as a quick, revenue-raising mechanism to meet financial 
needs. After 1983, the rationale became clearer in response to disillusionment with the 
performance of nationalised industries, particularly coal, rail and telecoms, which were 
claimed to ‘lack efficiency’ and ‘competition’ (Parker 2009). Thatcher’s confrontation 
with the coal miners’ strike (1984-85), in particular, was one of the most serious 
industrial disputes in UK history. In the US, under President Reagan (1981-89), a 
neoliberal agenda proceeded in different ways, notably via reducing tax on high 
earners (from 70 to 28 per cent); engineering noninflationary monetary policy; 
promoting business-friendly initiatives, such as the Commission on Industrial 
Competitiveness; and facing down union movements, epitomised by the firing of 
11,000 air traffic controllers in 1981 who refused to work (Krugman 1995a). One can 
consider these examples as illustrative of the second major meaning of neoliberalism 
I outlined above.   
 
The turn to neoliberal ideas within Anglo-Saxon capitalist countries was, at the same 
time, also reshaping the policy orthodoxy elsewhere, shifts that were often led by 
particular intellectuals. Arguing against Keynesian-inspired perspectives, critics such 
as Deepak Lal (1983), Peter Bauer (1981) and Anne Krueger (1990) helped to usher 
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in ‘a counter-revolution in development theory and practice’ (Toye 1987: vii). According 
to these experts, poorer developing countries were not radically distinct from those 
found in the richer North. Rather, the basic insights of neoclassical economics – 
notably, conceiving of all agents, both producers and consumers, as rational 
calculating individuals that respond to price signals – could be applied to all sorts of 
postcolonial nations across Africa, Asia, and South America. In this sense, history and 
geography were deemed less important. Similar to arguments heard in the UK and the 
US, such countries were criticised for ‘over-extending’ the public sector and channeling 
resources into grandiose projects that appeared designed by, and for, elites. It was 
argued that government controls on the economy often worked against trade and 
financial openness, resulting in negative effects on private enterprise and growth. 
According to this logic, if poor development performance was found, it was the fault of 
developing country governments for implementing the wrong policies (Toye 1987). In 
turn, these ideas progressively found a home at the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), an important consequence since such institutions could offer 
conditionality loans, as well as shape the ‘commonsense’ on development policy 
advice (Harrison 2004; Chwieroth 2010). 
 
During this first act of neoliberalism, IPE theorists offered a number of contributions for 
understanding how the global political economy was evolving. These debates often 
pivoted around how to grasp the larger relationship between state power and 
commercial markets. In respect to the UK, Andrew Gamble’s (1979, 1994) work was 
significant for offering an empirically-rooted and subtle reading of how neoliberalism – 
which, at the time, he referred to as a ‘social market economy’ model – required a 
‘strong state’ to function. Although Thatcherism marked a major reconfiguration of 
power towards capital, deep cuts to public spending were politically difficult to 
accomplish, while trade union organising remained robust into the 1990s (Gamble 
1994). It is germane to note that the precise phrase ‘states versus markets’, and even 
the looser expression ‘states and markets’ – defining conceptual anchors in many 
debates on neoliberalism – only became more widely uttered following the end of the 
Cold War. As noted by many, Susan Strange (1988) was important for helping to 
fashion an IPE agenda around such macro questions and, in particular, alerting 
scholars and other interested readers to how financial markets were evolving into a 
major ‘structure’ of power. Strange (1988, 1996) argued that the ‘market-authority 
nexus’ was undergoing a troubling development, particularly when it appeared by the 
early 1990s that governments were losing discretionary freedom in the face of 
pressure from transnational financial elites. In short, during this period, the term 
	 8	
neoliberalism tended to be deployed by IPE scholars as a way to chart and dissect the 
changing forms of global economic restructuring, including how to explain the evolution 
of welfarism and the expanding opportunities for capitalism in the context of the post-
Bretton Woods monetary order and the later collapse of the Cold War (Cox 1987; Gill 
and Law 1989; Gill 1994). 
 
 
4. NEOLIBERALISM ACT II: MID-1990s–MID-2000s  
 
From the mid-1990s, when invoked as a critical reference for enhanced capitalist 
power and ‘free market’ ideology, the notion of neoliberalism became increasingly 
common in IPE and related social science fields. With such use, however, the notion 
became something of ‘conceptual Swiss Army knife’ for unpicking a bewildering variety 
of problems across territories and scales (Eagleton-Pierce 2016: xiii). It is relation to 
this ‘mature’ sense of neoliberalism – or neoliberalisation as an unfolding variegated 
process – that we can now turn to. These uses, in other words, tended to gravitate 
around the second core meaning outlined in the second section, but also included the 
fourth sense, that is, as a basic signifier for the present. 
 
When examining major global policymaking trends and commercial shifts around the 
turn of the millennium, different forms of evidence can be invoked to characterise the 
entrenchment of neoliberalisation. For instance, privatisation agendas gathered pace 
during this time, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America, before spreading 
to all other regions. Policies associated with privatisation varied immensely within 
these experiments, from the total government withdrawal of certain responsibilities, to 
restrictions in the volume or quality of public services, to the transfer of public assets 
into private hands. Worldwide, the estimated government-derived revenue from all 
privatisation projects rose from $80 billion in 1995 to $180 billion in 2000 (Megginson 
and Netter 2001). The trend continued after 2000, but tended to shift from secondary-
share public offerings in Western Europe to divestment projects in emerging 
economies, particularly China (Megginson, forthcoming). In relation to world trade and 
liberalisation policies, this period featured strong growth and political commitment via 
the newly established World Trade Organization (WTO), especially in relation to North 
America and developing Asia trade. From 1995 to 2000, world merchandise exports 
grew annually by around 7 per cent in volume terms. By 2005, around 31 per cent of 
world trade was captured by developing countries as a group, up from 20 per cent in 
the early 1990s. The internationalisation of production led to increasingly complex 
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global value chains (GVCs): by 2011, nearly half of world trade in good and services 
took place within GVCs, a rise from 36 per cent in 1995 (Hoekman and Kostecki 2009; 
WTO 2015). 
 
With the implementation of these agendas, however, neoliberalisation brought forward 
fresh tensions, disturbances, and contradictions. If such problems had in part been 
caused by the destructive, ‘roll-back’ of elements of the state under early neoliberalism, 
the period since the mid-1990s can be defined, for some observers, as a more creative 
‘roll-out’ of state agencies (Peck and Tickell 2002). Depending upon the particular 
power configurations involved in each context, such struggles took different forms. For 
instance, through the World Bank, the turn to the larger ‘governance’ agenda with 
recipient countries can be highlighted. As argued by Dani Rodrik (2007), the new 
orthodoxy on development policy is a kind of ‘augmented Washington Consensus’, 
one which still contains the core ‘Victorian virtue’ of ‘free markets and sound money’ 
(Krugman 1995b: 29), but now incorporates a range of ‘second generation reforms’ 
(Serra and Stiglitz 2008). By the early 2000s, for the World Bank, the success of a 
neoliberal economy also depended upon the quality of the rule of law, state 
effectiveness, the control of corruption, voice and accountability, and general political 
stability. But this problematisation of early neoliberalism was also stimulated by a 
critique of the gap between neoliberal rhetoric or ideology and how successful 
countries actually developed. This critique existed in three forms, from its milder 
versions that called for ‘human development’ (Sen 1999), through the comparative 
benefits of the East Asian model of capitalism, where governments played a larger role 
in the market (Wade 2004) and, onwards, to the stronger attacks issued by public 
activists within the alter-globalisation movement (Chomsky 1998). 
 
Within this period, IPE scholars advanced more sophisticated analyses of how to plot 
neoliberalisation. Three themes can be highlighted. First, building upon earlier studies, 
there was a deeper examination of how neoliberal policies did not entail the retreat of 
the state, but rather its reconstitution, consolidation, or even advancement in particular 
areas. ‘Deregulation’, when uttered in a taken-for-granted manner, was therefore a 
distracting misnomer, as expressed in Steven Vogel’s (1996) larger argument that 
‘freer markets’ meant ‘more rules’. Drawing upon a Polanyian sense of political 
economy, other theorists in IPE and adjacent fields suggested that ‘embedded 
neoliberalism’ – anchored around ‘regulatory’, ‘managed’, and ‘social’ properties – 
offered a better description of the ‘common sense’ of the early twenty-first century 
(Cerny 2008: 2-3). Such debates were closely associated with how to conceptualise 
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the so-called ‘competition state’; that is, the remaking of government, in particular the 
welfare state, to make it fit for transnational capitalism (Cerny 1997; Jessop 2002). 
Second, aided via the larger popular discourse on ‘globalisation’, there was renewed 
attention on how the lattice of laws, rules, and norms was forming a global 
‘constitutional’ order in the service of large corporate enterprises (Gill 1998). Within 
these discussions, there was a notable spotlight on how international organisations 
were propagating neoliberal practices and the forms of resistance this generated, such 
as at the World Bank (Harrison 2004) and the WTO (Wade 2003; Gallagher 2008; 
Eagleton-Pierce 2013). A third theme – one which would quickly assume even greater 
intellectual significance as the global financial crisis struck – concerned the ties 
between finance and neoliberalism, particularly in respect to US hegemony and the 
reshaping of the international financial architecture, but also in reference to how 
financialisation, notably debt, had become increasingly normalised (Soederberg 2004; 
Thirkell-White 2007; Langley 2008; Panitch and Konings 2008). 
 
As is evident, IPE theorists made a number of key theoretical and empirical 
contributions within this period. However, the most intense conceptual interrogation of 
neoliberalism was conducted by geographers and sociologists, the leading figures of 
which have been noted (Peck and Tickell 2002; Harvey 2005; Brenner, Peck, and 
Theodore 2010; Peck 2010; Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2012; Wacquant 2012). As 
the global economy was roiled by the financial crisis of 2007-08, the idea of 
neoliberalism underwent further academic scrutiny in IPE, resulting in not only new 
empirical insights but also the start of a critical discussion on whether the concept has 
now outlived its analytical usefulness. 
 
 
5. NEOLIBERALISM ACT III: LATE-2000s–PRESENT  
 
Given its historical significance and manifold impacts, the global financial crisis now 
casts a shadow over many debates within IPE. Triggered by rising delinquencies in 
the US subpime-mortgage market, by September 2008 the crisis entered an acute 
phase with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers, before generating a 
major world recession and unfolding set of socio-economic dislocations. In the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis, a number of commentators and policymakers 
suggested that the event signalled a watershed moment for neoliberalism, or even its 
‘endpoint’ (Stiglitz 2008). As French President Nicolas Sarkozy boldly declared, 
‘laissez-faire is finished’ (quoted in Erlanger 2008). However, these initial judgments 
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now appear overcooked, with IPE scholars offering more nuanced examinations on 
what has changed and how to read financialisation. For instance, Eric Helleiner (2014) 
has argued that continuity and incremental policy change marks the post-crash 
institutional landscape, largely as a result of the structural power position of the US. 
For others, the financial crisis may have shaken some of the material and ideological 
scaffolding of neoliberalism, but this does not constitute a new era; rather, the latest 
phase is one where social contradictions have only deepened with an absence of any 
counter-hegemonic alternative (Overbeek and van Apeldoorn 2012; Major 2012; Van 
Der Pijl and Yurchenko 2015). At the same time, as policy reforms began to be 
enacted, the crisis sparked fresh thinking on the overall viability of neoliberalism as an 
organising concept. For example, Martjin Konings (2009) has critiqued how debates 
still tend to conflate ‘ideological discourse’ with actually-existing ‘neoliberal practices’, 
whereas the latter is often messier than the former. 
 
Beyond financialisation, other IPE debates which conceptually deploy neoliberalism as 
an anchor have emerged within recent years. Empirical concerns have tracked the 
roiling waves of the world economy, with a particular interest in understanding 
geographical diversity beyond Euro-America heartlands. In relation to the WTO, 
Kristen Hopewell (2016) has dissected how China, India, and Brazil adapted to the 
trading system through a conscious deployment of neoliberal rhetoric, ideals, and 
practices, such as via critiques of US protectionist policies in agriculture. Elsewhere, 
in reference to South America, Tom Chodor (2015) has used a neo-Gramscian 
framework to chart the so-called ‘Pink tide’ of left-leaning governments in the region 
and analyze the extent to which revolts against neoliberal rules have generating more 
substantive social change. If class-centric approaches have tended to have a historical 
prominence in IPE accounts of neoliberalism, more recent work has interrogated 
gender as another key category (for an overview, see Bedford and Rai 2010). For 
instance, Penny Griffin (2009) and Elizabeth Prügl (2017) have debated the World 
Bank’s contested relationship with gender analysis, including how it has sought to 
establish a positive link between gender equality and growth, along with the various 
gendered silences and biases in its wider development discourse. A particular debate 
has focused on critiquing the rise of a so-called ‘neoliberal feminism’ within business 
and wider settings (Elias 2013; Roberts 2015; on context, see Fraser 2009). Some of 
these latter empirical applications of the idea of neoliberalism can, therefore, be 
housed under my third and fourth major meanings. 
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At the same time, however, recent years have seen increasing levels of skepticism 
and worry regarding the utility of the concept of neoliberalism, a conversation that has 
featured IPE theorists and others in the social sciences. Today, the term has in some 
ways become a victim of its success. Neoliberalism often appears as a ubiquitous and 
often omnipotent experience, a presumed ‘force’, which potentially envelops 
everything (Clarke 2008; Venugopal 2015). This effect of conceptual stretching – 
including the many oblique, casual and ironic uses of the word – certainly gives the 
term a ‘troubled’ status (Peck 2010: 15). Two problems in particular can be noted. First, 
as the concept has been deployed across multiple territories and spaces, scholars 
have tended to claim that neoliberal practices take hybridized, rather than ‘pure’, 
patterns. While this is often a valuable route of enquiry, it can lead to difficulties in not 
only stabilising any kind of core analytical meaning of neoliberalism, but in comparing 
objects of analysis that may be very different in history and form. A second problem 
concerns how scholars interpret the concept in relation to social change and how, 
‘paradoxically, despite failures, doubts and cynicism, the neoliberal vocabulary often 
refreshes itself or, at the very least, becomes so normalised that users struggle to 
imagine what an alternative discourse could look like’ (Eagleton-Pierce 2016: xiv). 
Such usage patterns leads one to question if neoliberalism, as a single frame of 
reference, may be trying to accomplish too much, prompting some to suggest that 
scholars would be better addressing the complexity of modern capitalism via other 





This chapter has offered a brief empirical and theoretical history of how neoliberalism 
has been understood within IPE and adjacent fields. It began by offering four major 
readings on the concept: as a history of ideas with origins found in the 1930s; as a 
system of enhanced capitalist power; as a set of cultural practices or modes of 
everyday conduct; and as a generic expression to denote the current era. The 
discussion explored the theorisation of neoliberalism in light of the evolution of the 
world economy. Such periodisation inevitably comes with caveats on the difficulty of 
neatly bundling together complex socio-political relations. The ‘acts of neoliberalism’ 
outlined here feature blurred edges and, moreover, the conditions of one phase cannot 
be understood without situating debates in relation to a longer history. As a moving 
target, neoliberalism requires IPE theorists to be attentive to the labyrinthine forms of 
power in the global economy. Only through disentangling the rich tapestry of 
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neoliberalism can we grasp how it manifests itself across time and space and how, 
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